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ABSTRACT 
 
This chapter draws upon Arne Naess and Ronald Hepburn to think through some limitations 
of approaching environment and sustainability education via knowledge from science and 
technology alone. Naess thought that ecologists instinctively understood what many others 
struggle to – that the equal right to live and blossom is a normative value that should be granted 
to all living things and not just humans. Nonetheless, Naess held that ecology is a limited 
science. It is limited because scientific methods can generate descriptive facts about the world 
but not values to guide action in the world. For the formation of personal ecological values that 
guide action, or what Naess calls an “ecosophy”, systematic philosophical thinking about self-
realisation and nature is needed. Those who develop their own “ecosophies” recognise that 
human and non-human life are intrinsically interconnected and that, as such, all of life suffers 
when humans think and act as if they are not interconnected. Hepburn also saw serious limits 
to scientific knowledge. For Hepburn, scientific method requires the stripping away of all the 
embodied experiences that make people human. This chapter argues that from Hepburn and 
Naess we can learn that a balanced education is not confined to inculcating scientific 
knowledge or skills. Instead it also involves the exploration of ecological values as well as 
serious aesthetic appreciation. The chapter concludes by discussing how Ciro Guerra’s film 
Embrace of the serpent might be educational. It is claimed that the film offers viewers an 
opportunity to think about human–environment relations in alternative and more 
ecophilosophically fruitful and aesthetically serious ways. Embrace of the serpent illustrates 
how and why arts and especially film-based educational interventions can come to matter. 
 
Keywords: aesthetic appreciation, art, ecosophy, Embrace of the serpent, film education, 
Hepburn, Naess, nature 
 
 
THE ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND DEEP ECOLOGY 
 
There was recently a piece on the BBC news website about a team of scientists who are setting 
up a research centre in Cambridge that will consider radical technological solutions to “fix” 
climate change on Earth (Ghosh, 2019). This initiative is being coordinated by Professor David 
King, former chief scientific advisor to the UK government. The “geo-engineering” solutions 
under consideration by staff in the new Centre for Climate Repair include “refreezing the 
poles” and “greening” the oceans. In the former proposal, seawater would be pumped high into 
the air above the polar regions via vast masts in remotely controlled boats. The idea here is that 
the greater quantity of salt particles in the air would make the clouds in the area more reflective 
and, in turn, cool the poles below them. In the latter proposal iron salts would be dropped in 
the oceans to fertilise them and stimulate the growth of masses of algae that would absorb 
carbon dioxide in the air and render it less harmful for the environment. Looking to science 
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now is understandable. However, the notion that science and technology can in themselves 
“fix” climate change is not without critics. Arne Naess (1990) for one argues that the belief 
that scientific and technical solutions can solve the environmental crisis is one of the pillars of 
the shallow ecological movement. Naess is deeply critical of this movement as it rests on 
shallow ideological assumptions about the nature of the good life. Shallow ecological thinking 
sustains the idea that the good life is one of high production and consumption and material 
affluence.  
Naess argues that humans should not respond to the environmental crisis by focusing 
on developing technical solutions that allow high-consumption lifestyles in the West to be 
maintained. Instead the crisis can prompt reflection about alternative sources of meaning in 
life; it can help human beings “choose a new path, with new criteria for progress, efficiency 
and rational action” (Naess, 1990: 26). For Naess it is not primarily new technological solutions 
that are needed. Instead people in the developed world, who contribute most to climate change, 
need to fundamentally rethink what they value and how they live. In an influential paper Naess 
(1973) outlined his concerns about shallow ecological thinking and his preference for deep 
ecological thinking. According to Naess the shallow ecological movement does fight against 
pollution and resource depletion, but it has the central objective of ensuring the continued 
health and affluence of people in the developed world. The deep ecological movement in 
contrast is characterised by seven very different norms. It firstly rejects the shallow “man-in-
environment” image in favour of the “relational, total-field image”. Following Spinoza, Naess 
(1990) maintains that living things are intrinsically interconnected such that if living beings A 
and B are related the very nature of both is changed by being in that relation. Deep ecology 
secondly embraces “bio-spherical egalitarianism”. Naess argues that the right to live and 
blossom should be expanded to all living things and not just humans. He says it is “intuitively 
clear” to the ecologist in the field that the restriction of the “equal right to live and blossom” to 
humans alone “is an anthropocentrism with detrimental effects” upon both human life and other 
life forms (Naess, 1973: 96). The idea that non-human life is intrinsically valuable is a key 
facet of the deep ecology movement, where “the value of non-human life forms is independent 
of the usefulness these may have for narrow human purposes” (Naess, 1990: 29).  
The movement thirdly favours ecosystems and human lifestyles that are “diverse and 
symbiotic”. Naess remarks that “ecologically inspired attitudes therefore favour diversity of 
human ways of life, of cultures, of occupations, of economies … and they are opposed to the 
annihilation of seals and whales as much as to that of human tribes or cultures” (1973: 96). 
Naess fourthly explains how an “anti-class posture” means that future plans are only worthy of 
endorsement from the deep ecology movement when they expand classless diversity of human 
ways of life. Naess fifthly acknowledges that deep ecology fights against “resource depletion 
and pollution”. While this is the only or core objective of shallow ecology, for followers of 
deep ecology all seven principles need to be prioritised. The movement sixthly endorses 
“complexity not complication”. This means not ignoring the need to develop new technologies 
and environmental policies but only doing so in responsible and sustainable ways and with due 
recognition of human ignorance of the complexity of ecosystems. The deep ecology movement 
lastly calls for “local autonomy and decentralization” so as to, amongst other things, reduce 
energy consumption. In summing up his argument Naess stresses that the seven norms of the 
deep ecology movement are not derived from the practice of ecology but from philosophy. 
Ecology he says is “a limited science which makes use of scientific method” (1973: 99) to 
generate descriptive hypotheses about the world. Philosophy on the other hand is prescriptive 
and descriptive, containing “both norms, … value priority announcements and hypotheses 
concerning the state of affairs in our universe” (1973: 99, emphasis in original). 
Naess’s concepts of shallow and deep ecology open up some vital questions for 
educators, perhaps especially those in the sciences, arts and humanities. How should educators 
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and education policy makers respond to the environmental crisis? Should the focus be placed 
on teaching the next generation specialised scientific and technological skills to help them “fix” 
climate change, or should students be encouraged to think about choosing a new path informed 
by the values and norms of deep ecology? In what follows I argue that environmental and 
sustainability education ought to involve much more than the teaching of climate-fixing skills. 
Environment and sustainability education can be enriched, I will claim, via student engagement 
with deep ecological values as well as serious aesthetic reflection upon art and nature. There 
are three main steps to my argument. I first outline Naess’s concept of Self-realisation, in the 
process explaining why his deep ecology can survive Watson’s objection of anti-
anthropocentric biocentrism. I secondly draw upon both Naess and Hepburn to question the 
idea that scientific, objective knowledge is more valuable than knowledge from subjective 
human experience. I thirdly argue that from Hepburn and Naess it can be learned that a 
balanced education is not confined to inculcating scientific knowledge or skills. Instead it also 
involves the exploration of ecological values as well as serious aesthetic appreciation. I pull 
the chapter together by explaining why I think Embrace of the serpent is an ideal stimulus for 
reflection on the environment and sustainability. I argue the film has rich educational 
possibilities as it invites viewers to think about human–environment relations in 
ecophilosophically fruitful and aesthetically serious ways. I conclude that Embrace of the 
serpent illustrates how and why arts and especially film-based interventions can come to matter 
in education generally and STEAM programs specifically. Here I note that, though film can be 
manipulative, it can also be an educative art medium when it broadens the ethical horizons of 
spectators.  
 
OVERCOMING ANTHROPOCENTRISM THROUGH SELF-REALISATION 
 
Naess’s deep ecology has proven controversial. Watson (1983) suggests Naess adopts a 
position of “anti-anthropocentric biocentrism” – a position that hinges on the idea that human 
desires, goals and interests should not be privileged over those of other species. Watson is not 
in favour of this position. He thinks it requires humans to unfairly curb their natural 
evolutionary instinct for flourishing and survival. Watson does agree with Naess that human 
action should promote ecological diversity. However, what justifies Watson’s belief here is not 
the principle that all species have an equal right to live and blossom. Instead, Watson believes 
ecological diversity is desirable, as “human survival depends on it” (1983: 256). Watson 
maintains that Naess and other “ecosophers” do not approach the egalitarian aspect of bio-
spherical egalitarianism as seriously as he does. He picks up on Naess’s (1980) assertion that 
non-human animals should be cared for, for their own good, by humans. Watson thinks this 
indicates that “ecosophers” like Naess want to set humans apart from other species in ways that 
are not egalitarian. He argues it is not egalitarian to conclude that human behaviour is so 
destructive of the environment that humans, unlike other species, ought not be allowed to live 
out their evolutionary potential. Watson (1983) suggests that in any genuine bio-egalitarianism, 
human beings would be allowed to live out their evolutionary potential, like all other species, 
even if the results prove self-destructive. In the final sections of this chapter I will show how 
the arts, and specifically film, might encourage students to develop new and deep ecological 
sensitivities rather than the shallow human-in-the-environment values Watson seems to prefer. 
However, I will first consider whether Watson’s depiction of Naess’s work is fair. 
It is true that Naess thinks human beings should care and accept responsibility for the 
flourishing of other living beings. Naess after all states that a “specific feature of human make-
up is that human beings consciously perceive the urge that other living beings have for self-
realisation and that we must therefore assume a kind of responsibility for our conduct towards 
others” (Naess, 1990: 170, emphasis in original). However, I do not think Watson’s objection 
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that bio-egalitarianism is “anti-anthropocentric” is ultimately persuasive. Naess (1973, 1990) 
after all grants that some killing, suppression and exploitation of non-human life forms will be 
a necessary part of any human life lived in step with bio-egalitarianism. He says the principle 
“has sometimes been misunderstood as meaning that human needs should never have priority 
over non-human needs … this is never intended. In practice, we have … greater obligation to 
that which is nearer us” (Naess, 1990: 170). Naess (1984) responded to Watson, rejecting the 
idea that he or any other philosopher he knew had adopted an ecosophy of anti-anthropocentric 
biocentrism. Naess (1984) maintained that, while non-vital interests of humans should yield to 
the vital interests of non-humans, the vital interests of humans can take precedence over the 
interests of non-humans. The killing of a wolf is not always morally justified for the ecosopher 
but it would be to save a human life.  
Naess (1990) actually insists that humans, like other animals and plants, have a right to 
self-realisation, to the unfolding of their potentialities to the fullest. Naess comments that his 
ecosophy “says yes to the fullest realisation of man” (1984: 270). However, for Naess the 
fullest Self-realisation (with a capital S) of humans involves not the narrow pursuit of egoistic 
goals but “deep identification … with all life forms” (1990: 85). For Naess, Self-realisation 
includes personal as well as community realisation. Importantly, Naess (1990) believes 
humans, other animals and plants all have a right to Self-realisation. Naess does not then, as 
Watson has it, deny that humans should be able to realise their evolutionary potential. He rather 
thinks they have evolved to the point that it is now part of their nature to be able to understand 
and care for other living things and have an ecological consciousness. Naess remarks that “the 
emergence of human ecological consciousness is a philosophically important idea: a life form 
has developed on Earth which is capable of understanding and appreciating its relations with 
all other life forms and to the Earth as a whole” (1990: 166). In sum, Naess’s deep ecology can 
survive the objection of anti-anthropocentric biocentrism. This is important from an 
educational as well as philosophical perspective. In light of this, educators who want to explore 
the merits of sustainable living with students need not rely upon reasoning from human self-
interest and the anthropocentric argument that ecological diversity is desirable because human 
survival depends upon it. Instead an ecologically richer account of human personhood and Self-
realisation can be discussed as worth striving for.1  
 
SCIENCE AND VALUES, ECOLOGY AND ECOSOPHY 
 
A detailed investigation of the evaluations in a given ecological or other scientific 
investigation will never uncover the values at the end of this process. At the end of the 
scientific process lie ultimate assumptions of a philosophical kind. (Naess, 1990: 40)  
 
So far, we have seen that in his early defence of the deep ecology movement Naess (1973) 
suggested that ecologists instinctively understood what many others struggle to understand – 
that the equal right to live and blossom is a normative value that should be granted to all living 
things and not just humans. Nonetheless, Naess also held that ecology is still only a limited 
science – limited as scientific method can generate descriptive facts about the world but not 
values to guide action in the world. In later work he elaborates on this theme. In Ecology, 
community and lifestyle (1990) Naess says that when scientists make value judgements and 
develop prescriptions to guide action and policy they do not do so as scientists, but as 
                                                 
1 While writing this paper I was interrupted by hundreds of joyous school children together marching 
past my office on the Royal Mile down to the Scottish Parliament. This recent climate change strike 
and the many others like it across the world inspired by Greta Thunberg (2019) are a reminder that 
students can teach “grown-ups” about how to collectively respond to the environmental crisis. 
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generalists and philosophers. He reasons that it is simply not logically possible to derive values 
from scientific hypotheses alone. Naess does acknowledge that norms about what ought to be 
done are often at least in part informed by hypotheses about how the world is structured. 
Nonetheless, Naess draws a rather Humean distinction between two types of statement, norms 
and hypotheses. Norms are “prescriptions or inducements to think or act in certain ways” 
(1990: 42) while hypotheses are revisable and are staples of scientific method. Naess indicates 
that normative statements ought to be revisable like hypothetical ones. However, at base a 
hypothetical statement aims to describe what the world is like. A normative statement, in 
contrast, prescribes general guidelines for thought and action. Naess remarks that while 
ecology “may comprise a great deal … it should never be considered a universal science” 
(1990: 39) as it cannot by itself generate norms to guide action. Nor can ecology by itself 
represent the sort of total philosophical world view that Naess thinks needs to underpin well-
thought-through ecological values.  
For the formation of a personal code of ecological values that guide action, or what 
Naess calls an ecosophy, systematic philosophical thinking about self-realisation and nature is 
needed, not scientific experiment alone. Naess maintains that philosophy can mean two things. 
It can be “1) a field of study, an approach to knowledge; 2) one’s own personal code of values 
and a view of the world which guides one’s own decisions” (1990: 36). Naess adds that 
“ecosophy” is the name for the second meaning of philosophy that asks questions about 
ourselves and nature. Naess explains that an ecosophy is a “philosophical worldview” borne 
out of “conditions of life in the ecosphere” (1990: 38). Naess stresses that having a world view 
about life on Earth is different from careful and systematic philosophical expression of that 
world view. A philosophical world view is not just an approach to knowledge formation as in 
the case of the scientific method. Instead it involves many components including but not 
limited to epistemology, ethics, ontology, philosophy of science and aesthetics (Naess, 1990). 
Naess wrote Ecology, community and lifestyle in the hope that it would encourage readers to 
try to give more systematic expression to their own ecosophies. In this respect Naess believed 
that individual supporters of the deep ecology movement should develop their own personal 
ecosophies. These do not need to be founded on any particular philosophy or religion but will 
nonetheless generally be consistent with all the principles of the deep ecology movement. 
Those who develop their own ecosophies would certainly recognise that human and non-human 
life are intrinsically interconnected and that, as such, all of life suffers when humans think and 
act as if they are not interconnected. Attending thoughtfully to the deliverances of subjective 
human experience is a vital part of this relational-field aspect of Naess’s ecosophy.  
 
OBJECTIVITY AND SUBJECTIVITY IN ECOSOPHY AND THE SCIENCES AND 
ARTS 
 
Naess maintained that all attempts by scientists and philosophers to provide descriptions of 
things in themselves, independent of any sensory and subjective experience of them, had failed. 
Naess (1990) followed Whitehead in rejecting the idea that nature is a “dull affair” without 
sound, scent or colour. In particular Naess disputed the validity of the seventeenth-century 
distinction between primary and secondary qualities. 2  Primary qualities were said to be 
objective in the sense that they were in the objects themselves, independent of any human 
subject beholding the object. Primary qualities include geometric properties like shape, weight 
and size. Secondary qualities like colour or taste in contrast were said to be subjective. They 
                                                 
2 Locke (1969) expounded this distinction. He thought secondary qualities are not in the objects 
themselves. They are only powers to produce sensations in persons. Primary qualities are in the 
objects themselves. 
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are not in the object itself but are rather projected into it by a human subject. Naess suggests 
that, from this perspective, human subjectivity is severed of value, with prestige belonging to 
the “core of reality, which is real, measurable and scientific” (1990: 53). Naess argues that 
ontologically this gets things the wrong way around. For Naess it is primary properties that 
lack real-world content. He remarks that “the geometry of the world is not in the world” (1990: 
57, emphasis in original). Naess argues that in his ecosophy3 secondary qualities are genuinely 
deemed to be real qualities in the natural world. However here the qualities are not to be found 
just in objects in themselves. Instead reality is relational.  
To illustrate this point Naess asks his readers to imagine they have put one of their 
hands in their pocket and the other in the cold outside air. If they then put both hands in a 
bucket of water, he says one hand will experience the water as warm and the other as cold. For 
Naess these divergent experiences of the same phenomenon do not mean that human 
subjectivity is inherently unreliable or that sensory experiences of objects are mere projections. 
Naess believed it is possible to account for different perceptual experiences of the same thing, 
not by discounting the evidence from subjectivity but by developing an alternative “relational-
field” (1990: 55) ontology. Such an ontology takes into account the totality of interrelated 
experiences that go into any sensory engagement with objects. Naess maintains there is no 
contradiction in saying something like water A is warm in relation to hand A, but cold in 
relation to hand B. He stresses that the content of reality here is not just the senses and 
consciousness of the subject but also the objects and properties in the world: the water, cold, 
hands and warmth. Naess suggests such relational statements are precise and true 
representations of reality and not mere subjective impressions of it. Naess was not the only 
twentieth-century philosopher interested in how human subjectivity could enrich 
understanding of the environment.  
In a manner reminiscent of Naess, Ronald Hepburn (1990) argues that there are two 
different “thought models” for understanding reality. One model is the “objectifying way”, the 
other, the “subjectivising way”. Sciences provide the prime example of the objectifying way. 
This way involves the formation of hypotheses about the world that can be tested in controlled 
experiments. Inquiries informed by the subjectivising way are by contrast typically found in 
the humanities and arts. The subjectivising way requires sensitive attention to the particulars 
of lived human experience. The arts can enrich life but, from the perspective of the objectifying 
way, the focus the arts place on individual moods and emotions discredits them as reliable 
routes to truth about reality (Hepburn, 2001). The objectifying way thus seeks to strip away all 
traces of human subjectivity from the pursuit of knowledge, instead focusing on “the 
quantifiable objective qualities handled by the sciences” (2001: 26). Hepburn claims that 
scepticism about the truth-revealing capacities of art is founded in a general “disparagement of 
subjectivity as such” (1990: 191). Those inclined to disparage art are likely those who accept 
that the objectifying way is the only reliable way to reality. Hepburn (1990, 2001) questions 
these dualistic thought models and concludes that the arts and the sciences can both generate 
truthful understanding of reality. Hepburn believes that human subjectivity underpins all 
knowledge-seeking practices, concluding that “in art, as outside it, the subjectivising way can 
be a cognitive path” (1990: 196). Naess and Hepburn both then denounce the idea that only 
objective and scientific knowledge is valuable. As we shall now see, they both nonetheless also 
believe that, if subjective human experiences are to reliably help would-be knowers understand 
reality, they require thoughtful reflection and education. 
 
EDUCATING FOR ECOSOPHY AND THE AESTHETIC APPRECIATION OF ART AND 
NATURE 
                                                 
3 Naess called this “ecosophy T”. His ecosophy is in no small part inspired by Spinoza (Naess, 1990). 
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How does Naess think people might learn to develop their own ecosophies? He suggests that 
ecophilosophy is appropriate to the “university milieu” (1990: 36) as it involves examination 
of problems common to the disciplines of ecology and philosophy. However, he also indicates 
that studying ecophilosophy and forming an ecosophy are not synonymous. He states that we 
“study ecophilosophy, but to approach practical situations involving ourselves we aim to 
develop our own ecosophies” (1990: 37). Naess emphasises that developing one’s own 
ecosophy does not mean creating it from scratch by oneself. Instead “it is enough that it is a 
kind of total view which you feel at home with, ‘where you philosophically belong’” (1990: 
37). Naess’s relational understanding of reality has the merit of imbuing spontaneous human 
emotion and subjectivity with value. Naess does not however advocate that those who are 
concerned about the environmental crisis blindly follow feeling. He maintains that outbreaks 
of feeling “do little more than express what a person likes or dislikes. Value standpoints”, in 
contrast, “are reflections in relation to such reactions” (Naess, 1990: 64). Naess therefore 
argues that followers of the deep ecology movement should receive training in making their 
value standpoints clear so that they can meaningfully engage in dialogue with those who adhere 
to different value standpoints.  
Naess argues that an education that supports the aims of deep ecology will “counteract 
the excessive valuation of things with a price tag” (1986: 21), accord deep respect for the whole 
biosphere and concentrate on moderating consumption and living more simply. Naess also 
remarks that outdoor education should discourage “conventional goal direction” (1990: 179) 
in nature and things like being skilful or better than others or having the fanciest equipment. 
Instead it should encourage children to identify widely with non-human life through rich and 
varied interactions in nature. Naess (1990) was thoroughly suspicious of the widespread 
practice of schools examining students individually too. He felt this encouraged overly 
competitive and egoistic values, not deep ecological ones. While Naess generally emphasised 
the importance of philosophy and/or religion for the formation of personal ecosophies, he also 
maintained that artists and writers might be the most influential participants in the deep ecology 
movement. He suggests that artistic and poetic expression of deep ecological values might have 
greater communicative potential than the insights from professional philosophy (Naess, 1986). 
What Naess gestures towards, Hepburn makes clear: thoughtful engagement with the arts can 
inspire new perceptions, thoughts, values and actions, often better than communication via 
propositions in written or spoken language alone. He remarks that “new insight, new truth-
discovery, in art come as a collusion between artist and spectator” (Hepburn, 1990: 186–187). 
Significantly, “the indirectness of communication is … the most powerful means of not simply 
communicating propositional content but of achieving a concomitant, perhaps abrupt, re-
orientation of perception and thought” (1990: 186–187). 
According to Hepburn (2001), aesthetic appreciation of art and nature can be trivial or 
serious. One trivial approach to aesthetic appreciation involves distorting the art or nature in 
question and falsely representing how it really is. Another trivial approach is simply being 
unreflective and uncritical about the sensory information that comes from the aesthetic 
entanglement. What matters in any serious aesthetic appreciation is the level of thoughtful 
engagement and spectator collusion with the artwork or natural environment. Hepburn explains 
that art and nature can be unthinkingly and trivially perceived or attended to with seriousness, 
“with full and thoughtful attention” (2001: 1). To exemplify the difference between trivial and 
serious appreciation of nature he considers two different experiences of the fall of a leaf in 
autumn. If the spectator observes the leaf fall without thought the full significance of the 
moment is lost; it “must be robbed of its poignancy, it’s mute message of summer gone” (2001: 
3). However, leaf veins can also be suggestive of blood veins in other species, “symbolising 
continuity in the forms of life ... this autumn is linked to innumerable other autumns” (2001: 
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3).4 The arts can educate moral sensibilities too, perhaps especially film. Sinnerbrink argues 
that cinema can “elicit ethical experience by aesthetic means” (2016: 20). He claims that films 
do not generally invoke ethical experiences solely via abstract thought about a moral problem 
or dilemma. Instead cinema can enable experientially thick explorations of subjectivity, as film 
images and narratives engage spectators in multiple ways including their senses, emotions, 
imagination as well as powers of reason. He rightly points out that, though films can be 
ideological and manipulative, they also have the aesthetic capacity to be ethically 
transformative when they broaden the ethical horizons of spectators and challenge any 
ideological prejudices they may have via images, sounds and narratives on screen. Hepburn 
similarly believed that, while there is no necessary connection between art and ethics, great 
artworks can be appreciated seriously when they enable a rapprochement between the moral 
and aesthetic spheres. When this happens “some momentous moral vision is brought alive 
through the agency of great art” (2001: 59). Serious appreciation of art or nature and “aesthetic 
education” seem to be synonymous for Hepburn.  
Hepburn says that “an aesthetic education is an introduction to countless alternative 
possibilities for feeling” (1972: 488) where the new possibilities of feeling transcend the 
shallow clichés of ordinary life and instead ring deep and true. Likewise, art and nature are 
appreciated seriously when they lead those who engage with them to think and feel in 
previously unimagined ways. Serious aesthetic appreciation can elicit new reactions, but also 
new action and the formation of new values (Hepburn, 1990). Art can be most rewarding and 
educational, Hepburn says, when it presents highly concrete images that prompt spectators to 
see otherwise elusive truths about the world, truths that spectators of art can make their own. 
Hepburn comments that, though “we may often be content to experience in art a succession of 
alternative ways of seeing the world … there is no doubt that we also particularly cherish the 
presentation of a perspective that we can make our own” (1990: 187). Furthermore, new views 
on the world are “especially prized if the perspective – a highly particularised complex, let us 
say, of fact, value, emotion, attitude – is normally elusive, barely accessible to us, and the work 
of art greatly increases its accessibility” (1990: 187). What we can learn from Naess and 
Hepburn then is that a balanced education is not confined to inculcating scientific knowledge 
or climate-fixing skills. Instead, it involves exploration of ecological values as well as serious 
aesthetic appreciation of the arts and nature. In what remains of this chapter I argue that 
Embrace of the serpent presents an “elusive, barely accessible” world to viewers of the film. It 
is a world of moral and aesthetic vision rich with educational possibilities. 
 
EMBRACING THE SERPENT 
 
Set in the Colombian Amazon, Embrace of the serpent is a quietly magical and mysterious 
film. It is loosely based on the travel diaries of the German ethnologist Theodor Von Martius 
and the American botanist Richard Evan Schultes.5 Von Martius and Schultes made separate 
journeys down the Amazon in search of the yakruna plant – Von Martius at the turn of the 
twentieth century and Schultes some thirty years later. The former was searching for the plant 
to cure his unnamed illness of the body. The latter travelled because he had an illness of the 
soul – he had forgotten how to dream and hoped the plant would help him remember. The two 
journeys in the film are connected together by Karamakate, one of the last members of the 
Cohiuano people. Karamakate accompanies both explorers on their quests for the yakruna. As 
                                                 
4 Spinoza’s idea that god is nature, and that nature is a whole, informs both Naess’s (1990) and 
Hepburn’s views on the connectedness of all of nature. Hepburn says that “a serious aesthetic 
approach to nature is close to a Spinozistic intellectual love of God-or-Nature in its totality” 
(Hepburn, 2001: 6). 
5 In real life Theodor’s surname was Koch-Grünberg. 
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a young man Karamakate agrees to travel with Von Martius, hoping he will help him find the 
other last members of the Cohiuano. Before agreeing to travel with him he insists that Von 
Martius “respect” the jungle and not cut any roots or eat any meat or fish until the rains come. 
Von Martius consents to these rules. However, in a starving, delirious and tragicomical state 
Von Martius later spears a fish on an arrow and bites into it raw. As he is doing this he screams 
to Karamakate that the river is full of fish and that he cannot end them. After Von Martius 
collapses, Karamakate comments, “You have no discipline. You will devour everything.” 
When they eventually find the other Cohiuano, Karamakate is appalled to see they are ignoring 
their traditions and cultivating the yakruna. Enraged, Karamakate burns all the yakruna.  
It is initially less clear why Karamakate decides to travel with Schultes. However, over 
the course of their journey together it becomes evident that Karamakate intends to teach him 
how to understand the Cohiuano way of life, a way of life that respects the forest and the river 
and the living things in them. When Schultes remarks that “I devote my life to plants” 
Karamakate replies: “That’s the most reasonable thing I have heard a white man say.” In a 
pivotal scene Karamakate asks Schultes how many edges the river has. Schultes answers that 
it has two. Karamakate asks how he knows this and Schultes says: 
 
“It’s easy. One plus one equals two.” Karamakate resists: “You are wrong – the river 
has three, five, one thousand edges – a child can easily understand that but not you. The 
river is the anaconda’s son. We learn it in our dreams but it’s the real truth. More real 
than what you call reality.”  
 
Karamakate explains that, for the Cohiuano, knowledge is generated from dreams induced by 
the yakruna. When taken to the last yakruna plant Schultes confesses he intends to cultivate its 
potential for high quality rubber to help with the American war effort. Karamakate insists that 
Schultes cannot use it for weapons and killing. Instead Schultes needs to ingest the yakruna 
and become one with it. Karamakate imploringly says, “I wasn’t meant to teach my people; I 
was meant to teach you.” Karamakate prepares the last yakruna for Schultes to imbibe. After 
taking the yakruna Schultes dreams.6 Most of the film is shot in black and white. However, in 
the climactic dream sequence it explodes into colour. In his dream Schultes sees Karamakate, 
who has a glowing mouth and massive, iridescent eyes. Has he dreamed a different way of 
being? Has he seen the world through Karamakate’s eyes?7 At the close of the film he wakes 
and looks on in wonder as butterflies dance around him – much like Karamakate was doing 
when Schultes first met him.  
What might we learn from this haunting film? While it eschews linear interpretation, 
according to the director Ciro Guerra, in Amazonian mythology a giant anaconda carried alien 
beings to Earth. These beings stopped in the Amazon and showed people how to live – how to 
fish and hunt. When the beings departed, the anaconda became the Amazon river. The beings 
left behind them sacred plants including the yakruna. Guerra explains that when you use 
yakruna  
 
the serpent descends again from the Milky Way and embraces you. That embrace takes 
you to faraway places; to the beginning where life doesn’t even exist; to a place where 
you can see the world in a different way. I hope that’s what the film means to the 
audience. (Guillén, 2016) 
                                                 
6 The yakruna plant is a fictional creation. However, indigenous people in the Amazon basin do drink 
an ayahuasca brew made from the caapi vine to help them dream. 
7 Mark Kermode (2016) suggests the film inverts the dark representation of the Amazon in 
Fitzcarraldo and Apocalypse Now and instead turns it into “a crucible of light, as seen from the 
perspective of the indigenous Amazonian tribespeople”. 
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I think the film does ask spectators to see the world with different eyes. It invokes evaluation 
and reflection in ways that resonate deeply with the work of both Naess and Hepburn. The film 
questions assumptions about objective and scientific knowledge being the only path to a true 
grasp of reality. As we have seen, Naess and Hepburn also open up similar questions in their 
work. Importantly, Embrace of the serpent illustrates really well how and why arts and 
especially film-based interventions can come to matter in education generally and STEAM 
programs specifically. As Sinnerbrink puts it, “cinema is where cultures across the globe can 
find imaginative ways to address, reflect upon, question, and explore some of the most 
important moral-ethical and cultural-political issues of our times” (2016: 16). More than 
anything Embrace of the serpent exemplifies that film has the aesthetic potential to generate 
ethically transformative educational experiences. The film invites spectators to broaden their 
ethical horizons and learn from Karamakate. It invites them to reflect upon their relationship 
with and attitude towards the non-human world. Viewers of the film may also experience a 
sharp deep ecological challenge to human-in-environment ideology. Given the extent of the 
environmental crisis such experiences and challenges are arguably needed now more than ever. 
The film is dedicated to the lost peoples of the Amazon. It unsparingly sheds light on 
the devastation wrought by rubber barons on indigenous people as well as the Amazonian 
ecosystem. Naess’s principles of bio-spherical egalitarianism, diversity and symbiosis, and 
anti-class posture are clearly opposed to such colonial and ecologically shallow practices. The 
film takes viewers on a journey into nature and Hepburn suggests that journeys in art and nature 
may be especially educative of human subjectivity (Hepburn, 1990; MacAllister, 2018). He 
also holds that great art encourages alternative ways of seeing the world that were not 
previously accessible to the spectators of that art (Hepburn, 2001). Embrace of the serpent 
brilliantly brings to life parts of the Amazon and ways of living with nature that are very remote 
from most of those who live in the West. The film offers viewers an opportunity to think about 
human–environment relations in alternative and more ecophilosophically fruitful and 
aesthetically serious ways. Notably, Embrace of the serpent has the possible pedagogical 
advantage of opening up these issues for reflection via the relatively accessible medium of film 
and not the more abstract language of philosophy.8 For all these reasons I think Embrace of the 
serpent would be an ideal film for students in STEAM programs to watch, discuss and think 
deeply about. While I would recommend it as a resource for prompting reflection on the 
environment and sustainability in schools, the film has wide educational potential. They may 
not take up the invitation but all who watch it are asked to reflect on their value priorities. The 
film may even confront some educators and education policy makers with a deep ecological 
question: Do they want to help the next generation merely fix climate change and then carry 
on, business as usual, or do they want the next generation to embrace the serpent?  
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